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e existence of animal
pain poses a problem for the Christian
doctrine of the joint omnipotence and
benevolence of God is recognized by many
Christian apologists. Among these are such
illustrious names as C. E. M. Joad, C. S.
Lewis and Peter Geach. Geach touches upon
the matter in Chapter 4 of his book,
PROVIDENCE AND EVIL. In that chapter,
entitled "Animal Pain" Geach informs us
that
One virtue, if I am right, that
God cannot share with his creatures
is the virtue of sympathy with
physical suffering. It is virtuous
that a man should in measure
sympathize with the suffering of
the lower animals . . . God is
not an animal as men are, and if he
does not change his designs to avoid
pain and suffering in animals he is
not violating any natural sympathies
. • . only anthropomorphic imagination
allows us to accuse God of cruelty
in this regard. (pp. 79-80)
In other words, God's acquiescence in
the existence of animal pain and suffering,
great as such pain and suffering must be
acknowledged to be, is no reflection on
God's perfect benevolence. It would
appear that God simply lacks the ability
to be moved by animal pain and suffering.
He is simply indifferent to it. Men, on
the other hand, who do experience pain and
suffering, possess this ability to
sympathize, at least with those animals
most like themselves.
One might wish to reply that God's
inability to sympathize with pain and
suffering marks a real limitation on his
omnipotence. Geach, however, is ready
with a reply to such a critic: God is
not absolutely omnipotent. Geach argues
that Aquinas also recognizes limitations
omnipotence and borrows an
to God's Omnipotence
example from him, the purport of which
is that God cannot alter the past. On
page 24, Geach reproduces a list from
Aquinas of things that the latter claimed
God could not do. Included are being a
body, being tired or oblivious, being
angry or sorrowful, suffering violence

or being overcome, or undergoing corruption.
About this list writes, "it's no good arguing
argU:1.ng
that God cannot do what God has done, and
in the incarnation God did do all these things
Aquinas said God cannot do." (p. 25)
Now
we are left to wonder why it is that God
can do just the sorts of things a man can
do and because of which it is virtuous of
man to sympathize with the animals, and yet
God cannot sympathize with the animals.
In view of this contradiction, I think we
can safely and justly conclude that Geach
has not given us a reasonable account of
the correct Christian view toward animal
pain and suffering.
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